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Many speak about an ‘anarchist moment’ in describing contemporary forms of radical politics and activism. From the emergence of the global anti-capitalist movement in the late 1990s, through to the more recent movements of Occupation recently appearing around the world, we have seen a new forms of horizontal or ‘networked’ organisation and direct action that seem to be, if not directly inspired by anarchist principles, at least very much reflective of them. David Graeber, in an early paper, ‘The New Anarchists’ (2002) explored some of the methods employed by anti-capitalists for bottom-up, non-hierarchical organisation and consensus-style decision-making, methods that political theorists still have a lot to learn from. 

 Anarchism as an Anti-Discipline
Of course, this anarchist moment has also been reflected in a renewed interest in anarchism in the academy. In the past few years we have seen a burgeoning literature on anarchism. This most heretical of political and philosophical traditions is finally being taken more seriously, although, if truth be told, it is still very much on the margins of many disciplines, particularly political theory which, for the most part, is still centred around the exaltation of sovereignty. Indeed, perhaps there is something in anarchism – and this is not necessarily a bad thing – which resists its neat incorporation into disciplines, which resists its disciplining. Perhaps anarchism is anti-disciplinary, not only in terms of social and political organisation, but in an epistemological and ontological sense as well. And perhaps it is precisely because of its marginality to the disciplines that it is able to affect and disrupt them and thus, potentially, to transform them. I am not of course saying that anarchism has no place in the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences – quite the contrary – but its place always has to be regarded as somehow undecidable, paradoxical, liminal, on the borders, which is where it has, as I have suggested, its most powerfully disruptive effect. Anarchism may be understood as both a subject of disciplinary enquiry, as well as an insurrection against all disciplines (social and epistemological). I shall return to this point later.
These developments nevertheless demand a reconsideration of anarchism, indeed a return to anarchism. But what kind of return is possible here? This is a complicated question. On the one hand, there has always been a kind of insurrectionary impulse, a will to resist, a libertarian desire – what Foucault would call a kind of ‘plebeian quality’ (an energy or discharge at the limits of power which resists the production of docile bodies​[1]​); and what Bakunin would call the ‘urge to rebel’ – which of course transcends anarchism, yet which the anarchist tradition became the most coherent and forthright expression of. Anarchism turned the ‘urge to rebel’ into a theory, an ethics, even a social science and, above all, a politics. Any kind of renewal of anarchism has to take, as its basic starting point, its ethical point of departure, this resistance to power. 

At the same time, to take anarchism seriously today means to make an honest appraisal of anarchism as a tradition of thought and practice that is shaped by certain philosophical coordinates and which is founded on certain assumptions about human behaviour, knowledge, morality and social relations. Yet, as a political ideology – if that is the right term - it is also unusually heterodox and diverse, indeed, much more so than some of its contemporary exponents – and here I have in mind Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt, who seemed to want to turn anarchism into some sort of orthodoxy (2009) – are prepared to acknowledge. Indeed, the controversial yet, I would say crucial, place that Max Stirner occupies in the anarchist tradition – an uneasiness reflected in his expulsion from the canon in Schmidt and van der Walt’s Black Flame – points to a certain anxiety about anarchism’s own internal deconstruction of itself. As I have argued elsewhere, Stirner pulls down, or least makes problematic, many of the humanist and rationalist foundations that underpinned anarchism as a revolutionary discourse. And it is for this very reason that I have always insisted on Stirner’s place within the anarchist tradition. My point is that such deconstructions are a corrective to any rigidifying tendencies within philosophical traditions, and indeed are crucial to their survival. Deconstruction, as Jacques Derrida says, always works outside and within, as a destruction and a construction (1998). In this sense, I would say that deconstruction itself is a kind of anarchism, and that anarchism is a kind of deconstruction.​[2]​

So if we are to think about the relevance of anarchism today we have to not be blind to its tensions, aporias, and moments of internal contradiction, to its diverse and at times conflicting strands of thought. We have to become genealogists of anarchism in the Nietzschean or Foucauldian sense. This means more than spending our time amongst the archives. Rather it is recognize that our common heritage is at the same time ‘an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers that threaten the fragile interior from within or underneath’ (see Foucault, 2000a: 374). We can see here, also, that the genealogical methodology, as prescribed by Nietzsche and Foucault, is fundamentally anarchic because it resists, or at least is alive to, the authoritarian potential of any impulse towards unification, totalization and dogmatism. 

Therefore, I have argued that anarchism has to take account of theoretical developments that would at the outset pose certain problems for it, and might even seem initially to be at odds with it, but which at the same time force it to think through certain limits, both theoretical and political – for example, the limits of power, discourse, regimes of truth and knowledge, the unconscious, and so on. Here I am referring to the very important implications of psychoanalysis and poststructural theory for politics. And it is in trying to synthesise these with anarchism – trying to bring one to bear on the other, and in thinking one through the other – that we can speak of a postanarchism (see Newman 2010; 2016).

This is a term that has led to many misinterpretations; perhaps with hindsight it was an ill-chosen term, but it was never intended to imply that anarchism is somehow over or has been superseded. ‘Post’ does not refer to a coming after but, on the contrary, a renegotiation of anarchism and an attempt to revitalize it and explore its relevance for contemporary struggles, movements and modes of politics. In the same way that postmodernism is not a ‘coming after’ modernity, but rather a critical reflection on the limits of modernity, and in the same way that – as Foucault suggested (2000) – the critique of the Enlightenment embodies at the same time the critical spirit of the very same Enlightenment – postanarchism may be seen as a kind of apparatus that allows a reflection on the limits of anarchism, while at the same time situating itself within it. 

What postanarchism regards as problematic is the project of turning anarchism into a sort of social science or science of society – in other words, the attempt to see social relations as determined by an underlying rationality or series of processes tending towards greater forms of community, mutuality and liberation, processes which are objectively verifiable. We find this tendency, for instance, in Kropotkin, who based his theory of mutual aid on his observations of the natural world and what he believed were evolutionary and biological instincts (Kropotkin 1915). We see something similar in Murray Bookchin’s (1982) concept of social ecology, in which the possibilities for liberation and harmonious coexistence were immanent in the principles of the natural world, and which were in a process of unfolding into a rational totality. 

Postanarchism has no objection to the ethical and political principles at work here; on the contrary, freedom, solidarity, collective action, ecology and so on are absolutely central to contemporary radical struggles and indeed have to be seen as their common horizon. Rather, what is difficult to sustain here is the ontological claim that there is a sort of underlying rational truth to society that can be unearthed and observed, from which the possibilities of human liberation are seen to emerge. There is a certain image of society here as a kind of natural body that gives meaning to all identities, that conditions their behaviour, and whose truth must be discerned. In opposition to this image of society – which is something of a ‘spook’ as Stirner would say - I see social relations as unfixed, contingent and indeterminate and as bearing no underlying rationality or process which makes it intelligible. And rather than seeing the project of human freedom as somehow organically rooted and as unfolding like a flower, to use Bookchin’s Hegelian-inspired metaphor (1982: 32), I find it more convincing to see it as a project without end, as involving an ongoing series of inventions, strategies and ‘games’ with power; a constant work upon the self as well as on the relations and institutions that surround us and in which we participate.

 Four Axes of Postanarchism
I therefore find it more productive to resituate anarchist thinking along the following four axes:

1) Ontological anarchism. This is a term associated with Hakim Bey (ontological anarchy) (2003), but it can also be said to be inspired by a number of other philosophical approaches: Stirner, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Reiner Schürmann, Levinas, Foucault, and many others. We could describe ontological anarchism, or an-archy, as the absence of rational first principles. This refers to Reiner Schürmann’s claim about the ‘withering away’ of arché invoked in Heidegger’s idea of the closure of metaphysics. Unlike in metaphysical thinking, where action has always to be derived from and determined by a first principle, ‘“anarchy”… always designates the withering away of such a rule, the relaxing of its hold.’ (Schürmann 1990: 6) Importantly, Schürmann distinguishes this notion of ‘anarchy’ or the ‘anarchy principle’ from the anarchism of Proudhon, Bakunin and others, who sought ‘to displace the origin, to substitute the “rational power”, principium, for the power of authority, princeps – as metaphysical an operation as there has been. They sought to replace one focal point with another.’ (1990: 6) In other words, the classical anarchists sought to abolish political authority, yet they invoked another kind of authority in its place, the epistemological authority of science and the moral authority of society. Thus, in place of the state emerges a more rational form of social organisation. By contrast, according to Schürmann:

The anarchy that will be at issue here is the name of a history affecting the ground or foundation of action, a history where the bedrock yields and where it becomes obvious that the principle of cohesion, be it authoritarian or ‘rational’, is no longer anything more than a blank space deprived of legislative, normative, power (1990: 6).

So we can characterise postanarchism as post-foundational anarchism – a way of thinking about anarchism without essential foundations – in the sense outlined above by Schürmann. This dislodging of firm ontological foundations does not deprive anarchism of ethics, of principles; it does not turn anarchism into nihilism, as many have alleged. Rather, what it means is that such principles are never absolute, are not set in stone - are not ‘fixed ideas’ as Stirner would say - and they can give rise to different interpretations. They are meanings to be fought over and fought for. They are contingent. 

2) Epistemological anarchism. Here the scientific and positivist impulse present in certain anarchist theories is called into question. This does not mean, of course, that an anarchist politics should not draw upon scientific knowledge, but it should not seek to establish itself as a science or see scientific rationality as the fundamental basis for its ethical and political claims. Instead, what ought to be interrogated is not simply political and social authority, but the authority of certain established forms of scientific knowledge, whose discourses cannot be separated from power. Here we might reflect on Paul Feyerabend’s anarchist approach to science in his book Against Method (2010). His argument is that the methodological rules imposed by science are ultimately arbitrary and historically contingent, that they are not based on any firm claim to truth. Indeed, many of the most important scientific discoveries – the Copernican Revolution for instance – were only possible through a breaking of existing methodological rules. This tells us that the authority of scientific knowledge, based on rigid rules of enquiry, is on much shakier ground than it would like to admit. It is much more productive, according to Feyerabend, and indeed much closer to the truth of scientific enquiry, to take an anarchist view of science – to question the authority and legitimacy of scientific knowledge and to violate its methodological rules. Indeed, Feyerabend finds it extraordinary that anarchist political thinkers – and here he cites Kropotkin – while questioning all forms of political authority, uphold unquestioningly the epistemological authority of science, and indeed base their whole philosophy on its rather uncertain claims (2010: 14).​[3]​ Why should the same freedom of thought, speech and action, and the same scepticism about authority that anarchists demand in the field of politics, not also translate into the field of scientific inquiry? 

So rather than trying to establish a scientific basis for anarchism, we should ask Foucault’s question, which he posed in response to the scientific aspirations of Marxism: ‘…“What types of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a science?”’ (2003: 10). In other words, we must interrogate the power effects and discursive gestures of exclusion inherent in laying claim to the status of ‘science’. It is not so much a question of whether scientific knowledge is right or wrong, true or false, but rather the way in which it promotes a hierarchization of knowledge and thus a certain discursive authoritarianism. In opposition to this we should assert, as Foucault counsels us to do, a genealogical position, which would be that of an ‘anti-science’. This does not mean that we disregard the use of scientific knowledge or celebrate irrationalism, but rather that we retain a critical perspective that is always sensitive to science’s power effects: ‘Genealogy has to fight the power-effects characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as scientific’ (Foucault 2003: 9). It is a question of politicizing knowledge, rationality and truth: in other words, rather than according truth a universal position of abstract neutrality, such that it can always be proclaimed in absolute opposition to the epistemological distortions of power, it should be seen as a weapon wielded in a battle, spoken from the partisan position of one directly engaged in struggle. We should think in terms of, as Foucault puts it, an ‘insurrection of knowledges’ (2003: 9).

3) The anarchic subject. By this I do not mean a subject who is naturally predisposed to revolution or who, as Kropotkin would claim, has an innate tendency towards mutual aid. This is precisely to beg the question. We need to investigate the conditions under which we become insurrectionary subjects. We also have to recognize the problems associated with the whole notion of the revolutionary emancipation of the subject from the external constraints of power, as if the intricacies of our relationship to power – the way it both imposes limits and at the same time constitutes identities and elicits desires – could simply be overcome in the act of revolutionary emancipation. The question we must pose is: who is the subject who revolts today? It seems to me that we can no longer think in terms of preconceived identities and essential interests and identities, whether ethnic, cultural or sexual. Nor is there any longer a universal signifier of Man or Humanity or the Proletariat around which the great historical revolutionary narrative is constituted. Rather we need to think in terms of hybrid subjectivities, singularities, those who cannot be represented in any clear, determined, coherent way. This is why the gesture of anonymity, symbolized by the wearing of masks in protests, is so important to contemporary activism; there is a revolt against identification, not only in the sense of state identification and surveillance, but in the sense of socially and discursively defined identities and predetermined modes of behaviour and agency that exist to channel our desires into the representative structures of the state and towards commodified and regulated social relations. 

Furthermore, we need to take fuller account of that enigmatic problem of voluntary servitude, the desire for one’s own domination, our psychic and subjective attachment to power, that has long been recognized as an obstacle to revolutionary politics and which cannot be simplistically explained in terms of ideological false consciousness.​[4]​ Anarchism was always much more sensitive to this problem than Marxism, for instance. Kropotkin saw our becoming enamoured of authority as one of the chief factors in the growing domination of the state (Kropotkin 1987). However, we need to think this anew today, and explore not only the network of nodes – economic, technological, communicative – that seem to be producing such dangerous and violent pathologies, but also our internalization of fear, our reactive hatred of difference, and our desire for ever greater levels of security. 

4) Revolution or insurrection? These factors point to the need for a different understanding of revolution, one that not only seeks to abolish or transcend the coercive and legal power of centralized political institutions like the state, but one that is also micro-political in the sense that it tackles the more intricate problem of our subjective attachment to this power, our self-subordination, and without which any revolution would be doomed to reinvent the power it has destroyed. This was of course something that was recognized by the German anarchist, Gustav Landauer, when he said that the state was nothing but a social relationship – something that we make and participate in, and that we destroy it by ‘contracting other relationships, by behaving differently’ (2010: 213-214). He proposed a kind of spiritual transformation of ourselves and our relations with others, seeing this as being just as important - indeed the very condition of, and thus inseparable from – any kind of mass, organized confrontation with state power. 

This revolution of subjectivities, as opposed to simply a political revolution, was described even more vividly by Stirner, who sought to distinguish between two kinds of radical action, the revolution and insurrection: 

Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men’s discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The Revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on “institutions”. It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established (1995: 279-80).

The focus here is on a sort of subjective rebellion primarily against oneself, against the prescribed identities through which we are attached to power (he says it ‘starts from men’s discontent with themselves’). It is thus not directly aimed at destroying the state as a political institution, but at destroying the internalised statism that perpetuates this institution. It is an assertion of the power of singularities, a reclaiming of the self, through which the structure of power collapses of itself, as if the only thing that was propping it up was our voluntary servitude, our idealization of its power. The power of the state is merely an abstraction and abdication of our own power. Stirner’s project of insurrection - as distinct from, although not necessarily opposed to, revolution – has often been misinterpreted as a purely individual enterprise. In other words, it is alleged, by many anarchists in particular, that Stirner is taking us away from the genuinely collective project of revolution towards a purely individualistic, egoistic form of action. But this is to look at things the wrong way. It is not a question of egoism versus solidarity, or the individual against the collective. There is nothing in what Stirner says that implies that insurrection is a purely private enterprise; indeed, elsewhere Stirner refers to the possibility of acting in cooperation with others with his notion of the ‘union of egos’. His point is, rather, that if any sort of revolutionary action is not at the same time actively affirmed by singularities, if it is not made, as he puts it, ‘my own cause’, ‘my own creation’, then it risks becoming a sacred, abstracted Cause alien to the individual and to which the individual is ultimately sacrificed. So in this sense, perhaps we can see insurrection and the revolution as two sides of the same coin. 

 The Axiom of Liberty
Furthermore, what is being proposed here with the notion of insurrection – which I see as the horizon of radical politics today - is the realization of the freedom that we already have. This is also reflected in one of Stirner’s other key concepts, ownness (as distinct from liberal ‘freedom’) (1995: 141-154). That is, rather than seeing freedom as a social and political goal, rather than seeing emancipation as an ideal to be aspired to and a political project to be achieved and as something dependent on the destruction of political authority, perhaps it should be seen as something that we already have – something like ontological freedom. It is just that we don’t know it; we are not awakened to it. The realization of the freedom that we already have is coextensive with the release from our voluntary servitude to power. It is not a question, then, of seeking a state of freedom as a great prize waiting for us on the other side of power, but rather of affirming and living the freedom that we already have in the here and now. 

Jacques Rancière (1991; 1999) sees politics in terms of an axiom of equality – in other words, it is a question of staging the political dissensus or disagreement by marginalized subjectivities who enact their equality, acting on the presumption that they are already equal, even if this is not recognized by the regime of power, like the slaves in the Haitian revolution who took seriously the message of the French revolution – equality for all – when they rebelled against their French colonial masters; or women during the French Revolution who demanded equal rights and representation on the basis that they already had this right, just that it wasn’t recognized (see Rancière 2004). Perhaps in similar fashion we can speak of an axiom of liberty: we act as though we are already free, even if the forms of power that we confront seem so insurmountable. Indeed, to this end, Stirner found it necessary to develop a different notion of freedom, which he called ‘ownness’ – the ideology of freedom having been corrupted by liberalism, capitalism, statism and vanguardism. Whereas freedom depends upon a project of emancipation, usually led and imposed by someone else, and is thus a determination of power, ownness is the assertion of the freedom that we already have in the here and now, even in conditions of intolerable oppression. Thus, for Stirner, while the slave was not free in an objective sense, he was still his own, and this realization is the starting point of his rebellion against the conditions of his enslavement (1995: 143). Seeing freedom in these terms – rather than as an abstraction or distant goal of revolutionary politics - is the only way to dispel the illusion of power and authority (an illusion which otherwise has such a grip over our psyche). Todd May recounts a beautiful anecdote about a group of activists at an anti-capitalist demonstration who audaciously manage to force their way through a police barricade, and when asked later why they penetrated the police line, they responded by saying, ‘what line?’​[5]​ The realization of freedom lies in acting and living as though power does not exist.

So we need to think about what revolution actually means today, and whether it is still conceivable in the classical sense as the great Event of social transformation and liberation, one that comes about through the immanent development of social forces. It seems to me that we should revisit and perhaps rethink Bakunin’s call for the people to ‘organize their powers apart from and against the state’ (1984: 377). This can only refer to a politics of autonomy, and to the creation of alternative spaces of social organisation and life that resist the logic of statism – in other words, which allow for the emergence of non-hierarchical and reciprocal relations. I do not see how this can be conceived as a totalizing, all-encompassing action that occurs everywhere, all at once. Rather, it would refer to localized spaces and situations in which power is resisted and in which autonomous, self-managed relations, forms of exchange and ways of life are organized. This is why I believe the recent movements of Occupation, despite their apparent failure, were so significant. To see them simply as protests – and thus, as some have done, to lament their lack of concrete political agendas – is to fundamentally misunderstand them; what was important was the act of occupying and reclaiming spaces, and the horizontal organization of relations within those spaces. It is not so much a question of the violent confrontation with Power, or the attempt to seize the apparatus of the State – but rather of acting in a joyous affirmation of Power’s non-existence. We find similar experiments in a politics of autonomy throughout society – whether in squats, social centres, independent media, land occupations in the global South, hacktivism, experiments in the digital commons and alternative economies, and in many other forms. It seems to me that the notion of revolution – if indeed we can retain this term at all (I have suggested that insurrection or insurrections might be more appropriate) – needs to be rethought in light of these heterogeneous, localized (and at the same time globalized) movements, situations and spaces of rupture and dissent.

At the same time, while anarchism today – or what I call postanarchism – is the project of autonomy and direct action, this should not be taken in an absolute or purist sense. Indeed, what must be deconstructed is the conceptual distinction between outside and inside. We are always inside and outside institutions simultaneously. Power is not unified and totalizing, and its limits are not always clearly defined. Rather, it is heterogeneous, blurred, differentiated, given to a combination of conflicting forces and tendencies, some of which can even be turned against power. Power often works against itself or against those aspects of power that are more dominating and violent than others. Autonomy is not about always situating oneself outside power in a spatial sense, but rather about a different combination and intensification of relationships and forces that seek to contest, disallow, limit, overturn and disrupt particular relations of domination, inequality and violence – autonomy is about opening power to an exteriority, to a threshold of destabilization. Anarchism today must be prepared to work on multiple fronts, and in collaboration – as anarchists so often do anyway – with a variety of actors and in a variety of non-institutional and institutional settings. 

A Politics of Anti-Politics?
One way to think about this is in terms of the paradoxical relationship between politics and anti-politics. Anarchism, as I understand it, is never really entirely one or the other, but always both. There is an inclusive disjunction between politics and anti-politics, such that one proposition is true only if its opposing proposition is also true. Even Bakunin (1984: 314) while he spoke of the ‘total abolition of politics’ (as opposed to the socialists who simply wanted to ‘pursue a politics of a different kind’) at the same time went into considerable detail in discussing revolutionary tactics, questions of organization and the mobilization of people, as well as the shape of post-revolutionary society – all of which are, of course, political questions, indeed questions of power. We have no choice, then, but to formulate anarchism in the following paradoxical way, as a politics of anti-politics, or an anti-political politics. 

This tension generates new and productive articulations of politics and ethics. Politics, at least in a radical sense, only has a consistent identity if an anti-political, we could even say ‘utopian’, dimension is also present – otherwise it remains caught within existing political frameworks and imaginaries. Conversely, anti-politics only makes sense if it takes seriously the tasks of politics – building, constructing, organizing, fighting, making collective decisions, and so on. Where the political pole imposes certain limits, the anti-political pole, by contrast, invokes an outside, a movement beyond limits. It is the signification of the infinite, of a limitless horizon. This is both the moment of utopia – or as I would put it, the outside - and also the moment of ethics. Anarchism has an important utopian dimension. Indeed, some utopian element – whether acknowledged or not – is an essential part of any form of radical politics. To oppose the current order one inevitably invokes an alternative imaginary; one always seeks an Outside. However, we should try to formulate a different approach to utopia here: the importance of imagining an alternative to the current order is not to lay down a program for the future, but rather to provide a point of exteriority – a move toward an outside - as a way of interrogating the limits of this order. As Miguel Abensour puts it, ‘Is it not proper to utopia to propose a new way of proceeding to a displacement of what is and what seems to go without saying in the crushing name of “reality”?’ (2008). The outside provides an escape from this stifling reality by imagining an alternative to it; it opens up different possibilities, new ‘lines of flight’ and combinations of intensities, forces. Here, we should think about utopias in terms of action in the immediate sense, of creating alternatives within the present, at localized points, rather than as the outcome of the revolution. The outside is something that opens up in (anti-)political struggles themselves.

Ethics also implies an outside to the existing order, but in a different sense. Ethics, as I understand it here, involves the opening up of existing political identities, practices, institutions and discourses to an Other that is beyond their terms. Ethics is more than the application of moral and rational norms. It is the continual disturbance of the sovereignty of these norms, and the identities and institutions that draw their legitimacy from them in the name of something exceeding their grasp. Importantly, then, ethics is what disturbs politics from the outside. This might be understood in the Levinasian sense of ‘anarchy’: ‘Anarchy cannot be sovereign like an arché. It can only disturb the State – but in a radical way, making possible moments of negation without any affirmation’ (Levinas 1981: 194). 

The point is, however, that politics cannot do without anti-politics, and vice versa. The two must go together. There must always be an anti-political outside, a moment of rupture and excess that disrupts the limits of politics. The ethical moment cannot be eclipsed by the political dimension. Nor can it be separated from it, as someone like Carl Schmitt proposed (see 1996). If there is to be a ‘concept of the political’, it can only be thought through a certain constitutive tension with ethics. At the same time, anti-politics needs to be politically articulated; it needs to be put into action through actual struggles and engagements with different forms of domination, different relations of power. There must be some way of politically measuring the anti-political imaginary, through victories, defeats, and strategic gains and reversals. So while anti-politics points to a transcendence of the current order, it cannot be an escape from it. It must involve an encounter with its limits, and this is where politics comes in. The presupposition or axiom of liberty that I have referred to before – acting as though power does not exist – should not be taken as an escape from reality, but rather that which makes possible a more active engagement with and resistance to power; in the same way that the realization of the freedom that one already has makes possible an ongoing elaboration of new practices of freedom.	

Formulating anarchism as a politics of anti-politics highlights anarchism’s wholly original and radical contribution to political theory, indeed to the very concept of the political itself. It makes possible a displacement of the political relation from the state. It allows us to see that the state and the principle of sovereignty are not the only site of politics, but more often the site of depoliticization in which the unruly dimension of politics is policed, regulated, domesticated, and held in check. Anarchism forces us to shift our gaze from the state and the principle of sovereignty to an alternate and dissenting world, and to resituate the sphere of politics there. In this sense, it gives us a new understanding of the central notion of the autonomy of the political: for Schmitt, this refers to the friend/enemy distinction (see 1996), but this is a way of intensifying, sharpening, radicalizing the contours of the state and of affirming sovereignty, as it is the sovereign who decides who is the friend and who is the enemy. For Chantal Mouffe, who is in some ways inspired by Schmitt, the agonistic relation proper to the political is also staged within the state, and is concerned with questions of bordering, inclusion/exclusion – once again of deciding the limits of the sovereign political order (Mouffe 2009). While Hannah Arendt is in some ways closer to anarchism – particularly in terms of her critique of sovereignty and statism – her articulation of the autonomy of the political presupposes a sphere of public activity and membership of a distinct political community clearly delineated from the private and domestic spheres, and thus from questions of work and life (Arendt 1958). By contrast, anarchism or postanarchism contends that the autonomy of the political can only mean a politics of autonomy, in which new possibilities of life and co-belonging can emerge.	

Postanarchism and Political Theory
I think we can see, then, that anarchism – developed and sharpened through a postanarchist paradigm – offers us not only a set of radical practices and modes of organisation which might be applied to contemporary struggles, but also new tools for political theorizing. There are at least two main areas of problematization in the modern Western tradition of political theory that a postanarchist analysis contests. The first, as suggested above, is political theory’s preoccupation with the question of sovereignty, with the imposition of a legitimate social and political order that will secure us against the ‘anarchy’ of the state of nature and allow for the possibility of civil coexistence and the rule of law. Obviously this is central – albeit in different ways – to both liberal and conservative traditions of political theory, going back at least to Hobbes. This is the tradition of political thought that emerges with, and as a justification for, the rise in early modernity of the national state.​[6]​ Anarchism constitutes the most violent and radical break with this tradition in insisting that sovereignty has no legitimacy – that it is authorized neither by divine right, rational consent, democratic rituals nor liberal legal frameworks; that it is, on the contrary, an illegitimate and violent imposition of power. Moreover, anarchism contends that the state is unnecessary, that humans have the capacity to organize their lives cooperatively and autonomously, free from the shadow of Leviathan. 

Furthermore, as I have shown above, anarchism shifts the focus of political theorizing away from the state towards autonomous practices and forms of life that organize themselves in ways that are heterogeneous to the rationality of sovereignty. While the question arises about the capacity of nineteenth- century anarchist thought to come to grips with the more diffuse, networked forms of power that surround us today, the spectre of sovereignty remains with us, albeit articulated in different ways, through the governing rationalities of the neoliberal market and the biopolitical mechanisms of the state. Anarchism, it seems to me, offers us the most powerful discursive and conceptual weapons for contesting, and thinking and acting beyond these structures of domination. Anarchism provides the terrain for a genuinely non-sovereign political theory.

The second area of intervention concerns political theory’s preoccupation with abstract ideals and norms, like justice, which are seen to be universally intelligible, and which inform debates about the best form of regime or the fairest pattern of distribution. Normative political theory – as a form of moral philosophizing – is concerned with the most legitimate and just form of social arrangement.​[7]​ Clearly, anarchism, in affirming an alternative social order to that of the state, engages with such questions and develops a moral philosophy of its own​[8]​; indeed, the tradition of philosophical anarchism, going back to William Godwin (1985 [1793])​[9]​, which proposes the pre-eminence of individual autonomy over legal obligation to the state and affirms the moral right to civil disobedience, is situated within such normative debates. While anarchism cannot avoid moral and ethical questions, there is nevertheless a certain tension here with what I have outlined as the anarchic ontology of anarchism, or what Foucault (2003: 303) calls an ‘untamed ontology’ – referring to a kind of vitalist understanding of life and existence, emerging with modernity, where life, in its flux and destructive force, exceeds all fixed identities and forms of representation. This anarchic, wild ontology – exemplified in Bakunin’s ‘destructive urge’ and Stirner’s assault on ‘fixed ideas’ and the Christianized ‘spooks’ of morality and humanity - are absolutely central to anarchism;​[10]​ yet, at the same time, they are in tension with anarchism’s desire to ground itself in firm ontological foundations and normative commitments. The problem, as I see it, with such a desire is that it proposes a certain stable, eternal and moral image of social relations held up as the legitimate alternative to the state. Furthermore, it lays claim to a universal and neutral position of truth: I have already spoken about the scientific and positivist aspirations of some forms of anarchist thought. As Foucault shows us, however, the position of universality and epistemological neutrality is characteristic of what he calls the ‘philosophico-juridical’ discourse, a discourse that is closely aligned, at least symbolically, with the legislating authority of sovereignty because it functions to repress the memory of conflict and difference, proclaiming instead eternal, grounding truths. It is in opposition to this that Foucault identifies a ‘historico-political’ discourse that affirms the continuity of conflict – war becomes the ontological ground for social relations – and, moreover, eschews claims to universality and neutrality, adopting instead a partisan position in which truth is wielded like a weapon. Foucault characterizes this position in the following terms: ‘”The more I decenter myself, the better I can see the truth; the more I accentuate the relationship of force, the harder I fight, the more effectively I can deploy the truth ahead of me and use it to fight, survive, and win’” (2003: 53).
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^1	  Foucault says in an interview, ‘Power and Strategies’: ‘there is indeed always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means a more or less docile or reactive primal matter, but rather an inverse energy . . . a certain plebeian quality.’  (1980: 134-145).
^2	  See my discussion of the connections between anarchism and Derrida’s project of deconstruction (Newman 2001: 1-20).
^3	  A similar critique of Kropotkin’s view of anarchism as a science was made by the Italian anarchist, Errico Malatesta: ‘Anarchy, on the other hand, is a human aspiration which is not founded on any true or supposed natural law, and which may or may not come about depending on human will. Anarchy profits from the means from which science provides human beings in their struggle with nature and against contrasting wills. It may profit from progress in philosophical thought when this serves to educate people to reason better and to better distinguish between the real and imagined, but it cannot, without falling into the realms of the absurd be confused either with science or with any philosophical system’ (1995: 45-48).
^4	  The enigma of our voluntary servitude to power has a long genealogy, going back to the sixteenth-century figure of Étienne de La Boétie and his Discours de la Servitude Volontaire [1548], in which he asked the vital question: why do we obey a power whose existence depends entirely on our continued obedience? See also my own investigations of this subject (Newman 2010a; 2015)
^5	  This was referred to in a talk given by Todd May in a symposium on Postanarchism held in Athens in November 2011.
^6	  No doubt, state sovereignty has a much longer genealogy, as explored in Kantorowicz’s masterful The King’s Two Bodies (see 1997), but Hobbes’s Leviathan develops the first fully modern concept of sovereignty.
^7	  Here I am most referring to the normative concerns of Anglo-American analytical political theory, but these have also been the concerns of many continental philosophers, from Kant to Habermas.
^8	  See here a recent edited collection by Benjamin Franks and Matthew Wilson, Anarchism and Moral Philosophy (2010).
^9	  See also the work of Robert Paul Wolff (1998).
^10	  This point has also been made by Ben Noys, who connects this ‘untamed ontology’ with insurrectionary anarchism (Noys 2011).
